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How Has McDonnell Affected Prosecutors’ 
Ability to Police Public Corruption? What Are 
Politicians And Lobbyists Allowed To Do, And 
What Are Prosecutors Able To Prosecute? 
 
MODERATOR:  Honorable Vincent L. Briccetti 
 
PANELISTS:  Amie Ely 
   Alexandra Shapiro 
   Dan Stein 
 
DEAN YASSKY: Good morning. My name is David Yassky. 
I serve as the Dean here at the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at 
Pace University. I am just here right at the moment to welcome 
you and thank you for joining us this morning. I have been 
looking forward to this panel, this entire day of panels, for quite 
some time. 
When the McDonnell1 case came out, I wasn’t shocked by 
the outcome because it seemed like it could go either way, but I 
was certainly startled by the breadth of some of the language in 
the opinion.  My first thought was, my goodness, how are elected 
officials and other government officials going to know what they 
can do and what they can’t? How is this going to affect 
prosecution going forward, and how will it affect the high-profile 
convictions we have seen here in New York over the past few 
years? The issue of government corruption or public integrity is 
always prominent and has seemed extra prominent over the last 
several years. Here in New York, we’ve seen the leaders of both 
Houses of the State Legislature prosecuted, convicted, and now 
maybe to be retried. We’ve seen a surprising number of elected 
officials at both the State and local level prosecuted for various 
forms of corruption, whether essentially embezzlement or bribe-
taking.  And now, whatever one’s partisan leanings are, I think 
we might all agree that there’s more talk about public integrity 
at the Federal level than there has been in quite some time. 
 
 
1.  McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). 
1
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This symposium could not be timelier, and I just wanted to 
first thank all of the panelists who are here. We’ll recognize this 
first group in just a moment. I also wanted to thank Mimi Rocah 
and Carol Barry from our law school who put in a great deal of 
work to put this together. I want to thank the Pace Law Review, 
Editor-in-Chief Amanda Fiorilla, and the entire Law Review 
team. I hope the panelists had a chance to take a look at the 
briefing memo that the law review staff put together. It was, I 
thought, a first-grade work of analysis. So, thank you for that. I 
want to remind everyone also that our discussions today are 
being transcribed and will be published in a special issue of the 
Pace Law Review and then circulated to prosecutors throughout 
the country. So, your work today is going to be setting the tone 
and helping prosecutors for decades to come. Thank you for 
undertaking that. 
Our first panel and the question posed to the panelists is: 
How has McDonnell2 affected prosecutors’ ability to police public 
corruption? What can politicians and lobbyists do and what can 
prosecutors prosecute? 
We have, on all three panels, some of the really finest minds 
in the country who have been thinking about these issues for 
quite some time. On this first panel we have Amie Ely, who is 
the Director of National Attorneys General Training and 
Research Institute’s Center for Ethics and Public Integrity; 
Alexandra Shapiro, former federal prosecutor and partner at 
Shapiro Arato and has participated in numerous high profile 
white-collar cases including the public integrity case; and Dan 
Stein, former Criminal Division Chief and Chief of Public 
Corruption at the Southern District U.S. Attorney’s office and 
currently now partner at Mayer, Brown & Platt. And to guide 
and shape the discussion and inform all of us we are very 
fortunate to have, from the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York right here in White Plains, the 
Honorable Vincent Briccetti as the moderator. Your Honor, I 
turn the podium over to you. 
 
 
 
 
2.  Id. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/3
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JUDGE BRICCETTI: Thank you, David, and thanks for 
inviting me to participate. And also, Mimi, thank you so much 
for inviting me. 
I just want to say a couple of quick things about the panel. 
Amie really brings a perspective that is unique on the panel, 
namely that she’s working with the National Attorneys General 
Training and Research Institute. The point is she’s very focused 
on the State side or local side of the investigation and 
prosecution in this area. All three of my colleagues up here are 
former AUSAs in the Southern District of New York, as am I. 
Alexandra and I also have two other things in common. We were 
both Deputy Chief of Criminal Appeals in the Southern District, 
and that was a fantastic job. Even more importantly, Alexandra 
and I both started our own small law firms. It’s not easy and 
that’s why I have so much respect for her. Dan is also a former 
Chief of the Public Corruption Unit in the Southern District 
which tells you how qualified he is for this. 
What I’m going to do is give a quick overview of the 
McDonnell3 case. These slides were prepared by Amie. So, I take 
no credit for this whatsoever. Then each of the panelists will say 
a few words and then I will interrogate them. I’ll ask them some 
questions and hopefully that will elucidate some of the issues 
here. 
McDonnell v. United States,4 that’s the case that gives rise 
to this symposium and this man’s name is Robert McDonnell. 
Who is he and why do we care? Well, Bob McDonnell is a Virgina 
lawyer. He was born in 1954. He served many years in the 
Virginia House of Delegates. He was elected the Attorney 
General of the Commonwealth of Virginia in 2005, and in 2009, 
in the midst of the great recession, he was elected governor in a 
landslide succeeding Tim Kaine, who went on to run for Vice 
President. Kaine was term limit by Virginia law. Bob’s campaign 
slogan was “Bob for Jobs.” That may foreshadow some of the 
problems he got into later on. His focus in office was economic 
development. He referred anyone, any constituent or any person 
who had an idea about promoting business within the state, to 
meetings with members of his staff and other government 
 
3.  Id. 
4.  Id. 
3
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officials. One of those constituents was a fellow named Jonnie 
Williams. Jonnie Williams was the CEO of a company that 
developed a nutritional supplement called Anatabloc. I’m not 
even sure if that’s how you pronounce it, but it’s a nutritional 
supplement made from a compound found in tobacco. Of course, 
there’s lots of tobacco in Virginia, so perfect. What Williams 
needed to do was to have Virginia state universities do 
independent research studies on the benefits, the health 
benefits, of this nutritional supplement in order ultimately to get 
approval from the Federal Food and Drug Administration. So, it 
was very important for him to get this independent research 
done within the State. Now, Jonnie was not shy about asking for 
assistance from Bob McDonnell in this regard and to frankly 
grease the skids a little bit. He gave McDonnell free rides on his 
private plane during the campaign. He later bought McDonnell’s 
wife, Maureen, $20,000 of designer clothing. In the meantime, 
he repeatedly asked for the Governor’s help in getting research 
studies done at Virginia’s public universities, and when Mrs. 
McDonnell told Williams about her family’s financial problems, 
I guess because Bob had been a public servant for so many years, 
Williams loaned the McDonnells $70,000. He also gave their 
daughter a $10,000 cash gift for her wedding and $15,000 to help 
the McDonnells pay for the wedding. He took them on weekend 
trips. Mrs. McDonnell at some point said, you know, my husband 
really likes that Rolex watch that you wear and Jonnie said, no 
problem. He went out and bought one, gave it to Maureen, and 
Maureen gave it to Bob for Christmas. And what he was trying 
to do was to get the Governor to support his plan to get research 
done on Anatabloc at public universities in the state. 
In return for Jonnie’s largesse, totaling some $175,000, the 
Governor arranged numerous meetings, hosted several events, 
made numerous phone calls, and contacted government officials, 
all in an effort to support Williams’s plan to get research done 
on Anatabloc at public universities in the State. 
So, the question is: Did Bob McDonnell’s conduct constitute 
public corruption? The jury at his criminal trial said yes. The 
Supreme Court said no. 
Here’s what happened: the Department of Justice charged 
McDonnell and Maureen with bribery for accepting $175,000 
worth of gifts and loans, as I’ve just described, the so-called quid, 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/3
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money coming in, so to speak, and the quo was that it was in 
exchange for arranging meetings, hosting events, making phone 
calls, and contacting government officials to get them to support 
this drug. He and his wife were charged with Hobbs Act 
extortion and honest services fraud, which is basically mail 
fraud and wire fraud, for depriving the citizens of Virginia of the 
honest services of their governor. Importantly, and there will be 
some discussion on this later on, the parties agreed that the case 
turned on the meaning of the term “official act,” which is defined 
in Section 201(a)(3) of Title 18.5 There was no dispute that he 
took money, but the question is did he take it in exchange for an 
“official act?” As I said, the McDonnells were convicted. 
So, what is an official act under this statute? Well, it is any 
decision or action, important words, on any question – all these 
words are important obviously – or matter which may at any 
time be pending or which may, by law, be brought before any 
public official in such official’s official capacity or in such 
official’s place of trust or profit. That’s a breakdown of Section 
201(a)(3).6 The case turned on the definition of the meaning of 
“official act.” 
Now, at the Supreme Court, when the case finally made its 
way there, McDonnell argued that “official acts” were only acts 
that direct a particular resolution of a specific governmental 
decision or that pressure another official to do so. So, just setting 
up meetings or arranging phone calls was really not directing a 
particular resolution of a specific governmental decision or 
pressuring another official to do something. He said he was just 
trying to do his job as the Governor of the State of Virginia to 
promote economic development in the State. The government 
said, well, first of all, you took $175,000 number one and number 
two, we take a somewhat broader view of official act and it is a 
decision or action that may at any time be pending or which may 
by law be brought and, therefore, encompasses nearly any 
activity by a public official. A very broad interpretation of 
“official act.” The Supreme Court looked at the statute.7 They 
looked at their own precedents, and they also discussed certain 
constitutional concerns that they had. This was a decision 
 
5.  18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2012). 
6.  Id. 
7.  Id. 
5
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authorized by Chief Justice Roberts. The text of the statute, 
again it is a decision or action on – meaning not an event, 
meeting, or speaking with somebody – but an actual decision or 
action on a question or matter. They narrowly construed the 
words “matter” and “question.”8 They did that using principles 
of statutory interpretation. And, as to the words “pending or 
[which] may by law be brought,”9 they said that needs to be 
something within the specific duties of an official’s position. So, 
it is not just helping a constituent and referring them to the right 
people within the state government but actually acting upon 
something that is within the specific duties of an official position. 
The precedent that the Supreme Court looked at were cases 
that dealt with the statute in the past. The Sun-Diamond10 case 
said that just meeting with officials was not enough without a 
decision or action. McDonnell built on that, and said it would be 
sufficient to initiate a research study or exert pressure to initiate 
a research study so long as the official was intending that such 
advice would form the basis for an official act by another official, 
but that you need not actually make a decision or take an action, 
you need only agree to do so. The Supreme Court also addressed 
certain constitutional concerns. They didn’t find that the statute 
was unconstitutional, but they construed it narrowly so as to 
avoid constitutional concerns. The problem was that the 
government’s position, as I said earlier, was so broad. What the 
Supreme Court said is that this would cast a pall of potential 
prosecution over an official who follows up on citizen complaints 
and, for example, gets invited to a baseball game by a grateful 
homeowner. So, a citizen makes a five-dollar contribution to the 
campaign and says, “you know what, governor or public official, 
we really need to do X in our neighborhood.” The public official 
does that, and the neighborhood association says, that’s great; 
why don’t you come to the minor league baseball game as our 
guest? The Supreme Court was concerned that that would be a 
crime, a felony under the Government’s interpretation of the 
statute. The Supreme Court was also concerned about the so-
called “vagueness shoal.” Vagueness is a due process 
consideration and the Supreme Court said that it did not want 
 
8.  Id. 
9.  Id. 
10.  United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/3
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federal prosecutors to set the standards of good government at 
the local and state level. So, they needed to narrowly construe 
the statutes involved. 
This is the holding of McDonnell.11 An “official act” is a 
decision or action on a question or matter that must involve a 
formal exercise of governmental power that is similar in nature 
to a lawsuit before a court or a determination before an agency 
or a hearing before a committee. It must be specific. It must be 
focused on something that is pending or may by law be brought 
before the public official. 
So, the Supreme Court said under that definition arranging 
meetings, hosting events, etc. were not “official acts.” 
And here is the rationale of McDonnell.12 Chief Justice 
Roberts likes to have a turn of phrase from time to time and this 
is his term of phrase in this one. Quote: “There is no doubt that 
this case is distasteful; it may be worse than that, [b]ut our 
concern is not with tawdry tales of Ferraris, Rolexes, and ball 
gowns. It is instead with the broader legal implications of the 
Government’s boundless interpretation of the Federal bribery 
statute.”13 He went on to say that “[a] more limited 
interpretation of the term ‘official act’ leaves ample room for 
prosecuting corruption, while comporting with the text of the 
statute and the precedent of [this] Court.”14 
I think that might be the theme of today’s symposium 
because that’s the question: does it leave ample room from 
prosecuting corruption? Most people would think that taking 
$175,000 in gifts and cash and Rolex watches and so forth in 
connection with your job as a governor is public corruption. The 
Supreme Court said no, it is not. 
So, with that introduction what I would like to do is ask the 
panelists to talk for a minute or two or however long they want, 
about their take on this and what they think are the implications 
of McDonnell, and what has actually happened since McDonnell. 
 
11.  McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). 
12.  Id. 
13.  Eyder Peralta, Supreme Court Throws Out Former Virginia Gov. Bob 
McDonnell’s Conviction, NPR: THE TWO-WAY (June 27, 2016, 12:52 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/06/27/483711311/supreme-
court-throws-out-former-virginia-governor-bob-mcdonnells-conviction. 
14.  Id. 
7
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McDonnell  was decided in June of 2016, almost two years ago.15 
What has happened since then and where do we go from here? 
So, why don’t we start with Dan. Dan was the Chief of Public 
Corruption at the Southern District and he was also Chief of the 
Criminal Division. This is a guy who knows what he’s talking 
about, trust me on this. When Dan was doing that I was 
primarily practicing in the criminal defense area. I’ve been a 
prosecutor, but for most of my career, I was a criminal defense 
lawyer. Dan was well-known for being tough, but fair. The point 
is, he’s going to represent the prosecutor’s perspective and I’ll 
ask Dan to go first. 
 
MR. STEIN: Thank you for your kind introduction. The first 
point I would want to make is that long before McDonnell, it was 
my view, and I think many prosecutors’ view, that public 
corruption prosecutions – particularly when they involve 
allegations of quid pro quo bribery – were among the most 
challenging and difficult cases to prosecute, even aside from the 
issues presented by McDonnell. And to see why, I often thought 
it was helpful to compare a quid pro quo bribery case to just sort 
of a run of the mill securities fraud case. 
In a securities fraud case, you have an arms-length 
transaction between two parties where there are typically 
representations made in an explicit way about what’s being 
bought or sold. The challenge for a prosecutor trying to 
investigate that transaction for fraud is simply to prove that 
those representations are false or misleading or they omit 
material information, that the representations are material, and 
that the person who made them knowingly made those 
misrepresentations. You compare that with a public corruption 
bribery case where there’s almost never an explicit conversation. 
There’s certainly not an explicit document that lays out the 
terms of the transaction. The meetings that occur between those 
who are seeking the influential elected official and the elected 
officials in my experience in debriefing, are almost always – 
there’s more left unsaid than said. I remember being at a 
meeting with a person who we suspected made a bribe to an 
elected official and this person in my view very candidly 
 
15.  McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/3
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explained the meeting that he had with that official and then 
said, you know, at the end of the meeting I didn’t really know 
what we agreed to or didn’t agree to, and I don’t know that the 
person really knew either. It was all winks and nods and things 
left unsaid. That always was a challenge. So, prosecutors always 
had to look for substantial evidence to try to build a complete 
picture of the circumstances to prove their case. 
I think a second factor that also was always an issue before 
McDonnell and public corruption cases is the political overlay 
that lies behind many of these matters. I think unlike some 
areas the problem is that in government and politics there can 
be something of a zero-sum gain. Either my candidate wins or 
your candidate wins; it’s one or the other. It’s not the case where 
we can both succeed. So, the people who are making, providing 
tips or information about alleged corruption often have motives 
and agendas which may not be based on the merits of their claim 
but rather based on their own political interests. So, prosecutors 
are always also struck by that challenge that exists in public 
corruption cases. 
I think as Judge Briccetti alluded to in his introduction, the 
critical thing for us to focus on in this discussion is to understand 
that act is critically important – that the rules that govern public 
officials and those who interact with public officials are clear 
especially when the consequence is Federal criminal 
prosecution.  But I would say we should try not to lose sight of 
what we are talking about here, which is efforts to make sure 
that our public officials are, in fact, serving the public’s interests 
and not their own private interests, while at the same time 
making sure that our public officials are engaging the 
community and are responsive to the public’s concerns. That 
challenge is why these cases are so difficult. From a very high 
level, my personal view of the consequences of McDonnell are 
that perhaps it means that the way to address these problems is 
not necessarily the blunt instrument of federal criminal 
prosecution because it’s too hard in some cases for federal court 
and federal prosecutors to articulate exactly what that line is 
between pursuing private interests and yet on the other hand 
making sure people are engaged in the community. I personally 
think there is a whole array of ways that as citizens we can try 
to assure that our representatives are really focused on the 
9
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public’s interests and the reason Federal prosecutors got 
involved is because the avenues are not being pursued. So, 
maybe as McDonnell scales things back, it will be an incentive 
for others to step forward and implicate it in other ways. 
 
JUDGE BRICCETTI: Thank you, Dan. Now, Alexandra is 
also a former federal prosecutor, and she may have a slightly 
different take on this. 
 
MS. SHAPIRO: I’ll start with what I certainly agree with, 
which is that these are very important problems, and I don’t 
mean to minimize the real harm that’s caused by public 
corruption. But what we are dealing with in McDonnell and a lot 
of the cases we may talk about through the course of the panel 
discussion are prosecutions of the state and local officials using 
very vague and rather overbroad Federal statutes that are not 
really the best instruments for dealing with these problems. I 
think there are other tools that may be better. 
In many states there are already quite a number of rules 
and regulations and criminal laws in place to govern things like 
conflicts of interest and other problems short of bribery that can 
give rise to concerns that public officials are not acting in the 
public’s interest. In my judgment, those are generally better 
ways to deal with this, and to the extent that federal laws should 
be used, we need to have clearer statutes. 
I thought I would just talk for a few minutes about some of 
the constitutional concerns, and in particular the due process 
concerns that I think are animating the Court’s opinion in 
McDonnell. If you listen to the oral arguments, they also suggest 
that that was a very big concern.  This case was decided by an 
eight-justice Court just before Justice Gorsuch was appointed 
but after Justice Scalia’s passing.  I think the opinion is quite 
narrow, but if Justice Scalia had survived and been part of the 
discussions, you might well have had a different outcome in 
terms of rationale.  Certainly, there is a possibility that a 
number of justices, if not the majority, might have voted to strike 
down the honest services statute as unconstitutional and 
vague.16 
 
16.  18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/3
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Regardless, what the Court did do was part of a pattern in 
a number of cases we’ve seen in the last decade, where the 
Justices have expressed concerns with the abuse in some cases 
by federal prosecutors of very broad statutes.  Typically, what 
the Court has done when confronting these statutes has been to 
try to narrowly construe them. That’s what the Court did in the 
Skilling case,17 which I think is discussed in the materials that 
were circulated. In McDonnell, Chief Justice Roberts talks about 
three constitutional concerns. One of them was the First 
Amendment concern that we may touch on a little bit later – the 
concern that in a democracy, if you have a statute that permits 
anything, even a five-dollar payment for example, to count as a 
“quid,” and anything, including a meeting, can be a “quo,” then 
all kinds of normal interactions between constituents and 
politicians would be potentially criminal. 
One big part of the due process concern is notice. People 
need clear statutes. The statutes are supposed to be written by 
the legislature. If you look at most of the provisions of Title 18 of 
the United States Code, it is as you would expect in a penal code. 
The elements are right there in the statutes. If you look at the 
jury instructions, they pretty much track the language in the 
statute. What we are dealing with here, the two statutes at issue 
in McDonnell (the honest services fraud statute18 and Hobbs Act 
extortion statute19), are quite different. If you compare the 
language of these statutes to the jury instructions, you will see 
that the jury instructions contain language nowhere to be found 
in the statute. 
For example, the honest services fraud statute says that 
mail or wire fraud can include a scheme or artifice “to deprive 
another of the intangible right of honest services.”20 What does 
that mean? We might all have our own definition of it, but it 
could be just about anything. And using mail and wire fraud for 
bribery is like putting a square peg in a round hole.  A typical 
scheme to defraud under the mail and wire fraud statutes is a 
scheme to obtain money or property by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, or false representations or promises. Well, 
 
17.  Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010). 
18.  18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012). 
19.  18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012). 
20.  18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012). 
11
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bribery typically does not involve any false representation or 
promise. It is a payment in exchange for some sort of official 
action. 
As for the extortion provision of the Hobbs Act, bribery is 
somewhat divorced from what the statute says and what its 
purpose was. It talks about extortion “under color of official 
right,”21 and the Supreme Court has held that that includes 
bribery.  But several justices starting with Justice Thomas in 
the Evans case in the early ‘90s and more recently Justices 
Breyer and Sotomayor, both expressed some doubts about 
whether the statute even covers bribery.22 The history and the 
language both suggest that what the statute is actually 
addressing is an effort by an official to get property by 
pretending to be entitled to it by virtue of his official position. 
It’s very different from bribery. 
There’s one other thing I want to mention that illustrates 
why the Court was rightly concerned the dangers of the 
overbroad use of these Federal statutes to prosecute state and 
local officials. We can all agree with Chief Justice Roberts’ 
sentiment in the McDonnell opinion that the facts were 
“tawdry.”  We don’t want public officials to be taking lavish gifts 
from their constituents. Unfortunately, at the time in question, 
under Virginia law it was not illegal for public officials to take 
these kinds of gifts. When the decision came out, in fact, the 
press revealed that Senator Tim Kaine, who had previously also 
been the Governor of Virginia, had taken some gifts from time 
to time as Governor (although they weren’t nearly as lavish).  
There was nothing wrong with it under state law, yet here you 
had the federal government coming in and saying this is 
criminal conduct. Fortunately, Virginia changed its law after the 
prosecution of Governor McDonnell. I don’t know exactly what 
the limits are, but I think there’s a pretty tight limit on the 
amount of gifts public officials can accept in Virginia now. What 
this illustrates, in my judgment, is that best way to deal with 
these issues is to have appropriate state laws, and, to the extent 
of there are loopholes in the state laws, to try to close them up. 
 
21.  18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012). 
22.  See Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1437 (2016) (Breyer, J., 
concurring); id. at 1445 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Evans v. United States, 
504 U.S. 255, 278 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/3
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It would be great if Congress could pass a clearer criminal 
statute to deal with state and local public corruption in 
appropriate circumstances, but who knows if that will happen. 
 
JUDGE BRICCETTI: This is actually a great segue to 
Amie’s expertise because she is focusing on what the impact of 
McDonnell on state corruption prosecutions, and Alexandra just 
said these kinds of things can be done locally and it is better if it 
is done locally than it is federally so that seems to be the perfect 
segue for Amie’s presentation. 
 
MS. ELY: Thank you, Judge. Does McDonnell impact state 
cases or do state prosecutors really need to worry about it? It 
kind of depends on how you see McDonnell. 
Some ways of looking at it are rather narrow: It is really just 
a question of “official acts” under 201 and what that means, and 
the case begins and ends with that. There is a paragraph in 
McDonnell that talks a lot about the federalism issues, which I 
think it is a great thing for state prosecutors to key in on if they 
have McDonnell motions. If this is what McDonnell means, then 
why be worried? This is not such a problem for state prosecutors. 
There is another way of looking at it – I think Alexandra 
will probably touch on some of these during our conversations 
that will follow: Yes, this is a question of statutory construction, 
but it’s also broader than that. In this reading, McDonnell is the 
sibling of the chemical weapons case. It is the sibling of the “fish 
case,” Yates,23 where the Supreme Court says an undersized 
grouper is not a tangible thing. It is the sort of case that stands 
for the idea that federal prosecutors, in particular, are 
overreaching and the Supreme Court is going to construe 
statutes narrowly to try to prevent that overreaching. It can also 
be seen as more of our general “prosecutors are overreaching” 
case, in that regard, and in that way can cause some problems 
even for state prosecutors. There is also the Rule of Lenity 
aspect, if the statute is vague, and then again we have the 
federalism paragraph. If that is what McDonnell means, it’s a 
little bit more troubling for state prosecutors. 
 
 
23.  Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). 
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So, which is it? Is McDonnell narrow? Is it broad? Well, it’s 
both. The cases have not been all of one mind. The judges have 
not been all of one mind. We’ve got federal support for both 
readings. We will talk about a narrow construction in the 
Ferriero case.24 Some decisions have sort of a broad construction 
of McDonnell, like the Tavares case.25 We’ll talk about that a 
little bit and what it means for states with 201 cognates. There 
are some state bribery statutes, like that in Massachusetts, that 
are intentionally patterned after the federal section 201. In 
those states, then I think McDonnell does pose a problem for 
state prosecutors. 
There is also state support for both the narrow and broad 
reading. Again, we’ll talk a little bit more about the narrow 
reading. 
There’s a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, Veon,26 which 
sort of talks about the McDonnell penumbra and suggests that 
in cases that involve public officials, some of the animating 
concerns – again that Alexandra talked about – about wanting 
to have them representative democracy, about wanting to make 
sure that your politicians can be responsive to the people who 
they represent, are important. There is at least one case where 
the Supreme Court of one state sort of took those concerns and 
imported them into a state statute that was not similar to 201. 
If McDonnell was construed narrowly by that Court, the judges 
would not have cited it in the way they did to really reverse the 
conviction. 
So, looking a little bit more closely at a narrow state 
decision, Degnan.27 It involves a garbage truck. So, in this case 
the Mayor’s Chief of Staff, Mr. Degnan, threatened to terminate 
a contract if the trash company did not donate a truck to a small 
town in the Dominican Republic. Again, another Massachusetts 
case. We’ve got that same cognate, but the Prosecutors here 
charged both the official acts prong – which is very similar to 
201’s official acts prong – and something a little bit broader: the 
“official responsibilities” prong that was charged by the state 
prosecutors in this case refers to the “direct administrative or 
 
24.  United States v. Ferriero, 866 F.3d 107 (3d Cir.2017). 
25.  Tavares v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E.3d 1168 (Mass. 2018). 
26.  Commonwealth v. Veon, 150 A.3d 435 (Pa. 2016). 
27.  Commonwealth v. Degnan, 73 N.E.3d 823 (Mass. 2017). 
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operating authority, whether intermediate or final, and either 
exercisable alone or with others, [and either] personal[ly] or 
through subordinates, to approve, disapprove, or otherwise 
direct [Government] action.”28 This is much broader than the 
definition of “official act” under 201, and that was what saved 
the day in this case. 
The Court held that the contract was certainly within the 
Defendant’s official responsibility. They cited McDonnell only for 
the proposition that the jury was permitted to consider broad 
range of pertinent evidence. We will get back to some of the ways 
that prosecutors might deal with that. This gives you an idea 
that what you charge, looking carefully at your statutes really 
matters. And trying to find statutes that are not directly 
imperiled by McDonnell can be a very helpful way to avoid a 
falling prey to it. 
Ferriero is a federal case.29 There were New Jersey state law 
bribery predicates in this racketeering case. Ferriero was the 
Chair of the county party organization. He recommended a 
business to officials and got a kickback. The Third Circuit said 
McDonnell is about statutory construction of one federal statute, 
constitutional concerns raised by the Government’s position, 
vagueness, and federalism. 
Then, applying those four concepts to this racketeering case, 
the Third Circuit said these are both bribery statutes but there 
is no reason to transplant the conclusions of McDonnell that 
stem solely from the Court’s application of general statutory 
construction principles to 201, the particular statute at issue in 
that case. 
The Judges said that the New Jersey state bribery statute 
was narrower than 201, so its constitutional concerns that 
animated the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell were not 
a problem here, and that the statute was not unconstitutionally 
vague. 
And they acknowledged the federalism issue. This is an 
interesting thing, I think particularly for federal prosecutors. 
They said that even though the federal prosecutors are those 
who are enforcing the law in this case, they are applying a state 
 
28.  17 C.F.R. § 140.735-6(b), n.14 (2018). 
29.  United States v. Ferriero, 866 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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statute. They are applying a statute from New Jersey written by 
the New Jersey legislature. 
That was not an issue that was discussed in Tavares, that 
First Circuit case, which was also a racketeering case. Again, 
we’ve got the Massachusetts cognate there, so I think that that 
may be one of the reasons why Ferriero and Tavares come out 
differently. 
I want to talk very briefly about a couple of state cases and 
I think we will talk about some of the challenges that state 
prosecutors can face in corruption cases. These cases can both 
show some of the opportunity for enforcement at the state level 
and some of the difficulties that prosecutors can face. 
This photograph was taken, I believe, either the day that 
Mike Hubbard was indicted or possibly the day after. He was the 
Speaker of the House. He’s having a press conference. The 
people around him are his fellow legislators in the state. This 
was the response to charges brought by the Alabama Attorney 
General’s office: It was a press conference held by the Defendant, 
with the support of the people who he served with on the state 
legislature. I’m so glad to see Dan Cort here, who you will have 
a chance to hear from on a later panel, but having strong 
leadership at the Attorney General level, and at the actual unit 
level, I think is hugely important in these sort of cases. The lead 
prosecutor was somebody who had been a federal prosecutor. 
He’d been a state prosecutor. He was somebody who knew how 
to build corruption cases. 
There were allegations of politics, which I may get into a bit 
once we have our discussions, and the sorts of things that federal 
prosecutors do not have to deal with in quite the degree I think 
than state prosecutors. 
Hubbard was convicted after trial. At the trial level – even 
though he wasn’t charged with violating the Alabama bribery 
statute – at the trial level, there were McDonnell motions. On 
appeal, I was told by the prosecutors, defense counsel abandoned 
the McDonnell arguments. 
This is another case that is, I think, more about sort of the 
penumbra of McDonnell. This was a case, Utah v. Shurtleff, 
where the former Attorney General of Utah was charged by a 
local prosecutor. After those charges were filed, the McDonnell 
case came out. The local prosecutor moved to dismiss the case 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/3
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based on both McDonnell and on Brady grounds. 
The Utah bribery statute is quite dissimilar from the federal 
bribery statute. I think that there are very strong arguments 
that could have been made that McDonnell did not apply to it – 
but I think the concern that McDonnell did may have animated 
the decision by this Prosecutor to dismiss the case. One 
important note, though: the Court, in its dismissal did not cite 
McDonnell as grounds for dismissing the case. 
A few final points: I think it is important for prosecutors to 
be prepared to argue the limits of McDonnell and to make sure 
they understand it, and that they look carefully at whether their 
statutes are actually imperiled by it. I think there are very 
strong arguments that it does not apply in most cases, as long as 
your state does not have a cognate to 201. 
I think for federal prosecutors, RICO prosecutions may be 
safer, if they’re charging somebody in a state where the state 
bribery law is not a cognate 201. 
It is important for prosecutors to think about McDonnell 
during the investigation. If you’re lucky enough to have a 
proactive investigation where you’ve got a confidential 
informant who can make a specific request for what it is the 
official is going to do, make sure that “act” the CI requests is for 
something that actually falls under your statute when you are 
charging them. 
Look really carefully at the statutes. If you’ve got something 
where part of your statute is a cognate and part of your statute 
is not, make sure you charge, if the facts support, the broader 
possibility under your statute. 
When you are thinking about your jury instructions, 
obviously be precise. If you need to acknowledge McDonnell, do 
that. 
When you are looking at your verdict forms, you should 
consider special verdict forms. You should consider whether you 
think you are going to have official act issues. You should 
consider listing what the quo was, what it is that you are 
alleging that your official did and let the jury make a specific 
determination about what quos you have proven. They are 
obviously downsides to using special verdict forms, as well, but 
it is something that the prosecutors should consider. 
 
17
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JUDGE BRICCETTI: Dan, I have a question for you. Here’s 
my question: 
Of course, you were Chief of Public Corruption; where do 
you see McDonnell having a greater impact for prosecutors, at 
the charging stage, in other words, when they have to decide 
whether to indict and decide whether a prosecution will be 
successful because naturally you do not want to indict unless you 
are pretty darn sure you are going to prevail, or does it have a 
greater impact at the trial phrase, meaning the higher burden 
articulated by McDonnell? Where do you think McDonnell has 
the greatest impact? 
 
MR. STEIN: So, I think in the short term it can be the trial 
phase because there were cases before McDonnell that 
prosecutors had to sort out at a trial and retrial. 
 
JUDGE BRICCETTI: Such as Skelos30 and Silver.31 
 
MR. STEIN: But I think in the long term you are going to 
see it more at the charging phase. I think one example that we 
should all think about, although I do not have direct first-hand 
knowledge, but you can see in New York City, where there was 
a long-running investigation that became public of the Mayor. 
You had people who pled guilty to paying bribes to the Mayor, 
and the Mayor was not charged. The U.S. Attorney’s office 
announced that they were not to charge him. I suspect, although 
I do not know, that McDonnell had something to do with that 
because the evidence might have been that at least in the 
Mayor’s perspective of what he was doing was receiving 
contributions in order to have meetings and not to perform 
official acts. 
I think the other places where you are going to see an impact 
of McDonnell is in how prosecutors allocate their resources. 
Whereas McDonnell they might have focused on trying to prove 
cases of quid pro quo corruption. They might decide now that 
there are other areas where they can focus their resources. There 
are many cases that we did in the Southern District before 
 
30.  United States v. Skelos, 707 F. App’x. 733 (2d Cir. 2017). 
31.  United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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McDonnell and hopefully will after McDonnell, that have 
nothing to do with quid pro quo bribery. They have to do with 
elected officials putting supporters or cronies or girlfriends or 
siblings in charge of not-for-profit organizations, directing 
grants to those not-for-profit organizations, and having the 
money circle back to them. McDonnell has nothing to say about 
those cases. You might see prosecutors focused more on that. I 
feel sometimes certainly in the news these days, I have not heard 
enough discussion of this, but at the Federal level there is a 
conflict of interest statute that does not require a quid pro quo, 
but does require that federal officials participate personally and 
substantially in some official action while having a conflict of 
interest. You might see prosecutors focusing more on those kinds 
of cases where again McDonnell has nothing to say about it. 
 
JUDGE BRICCETTI: So, you really think that the direct 
impact of McDonnell is going to encourage the prosecutors to 
move away from the honest services prosecution which has been 
so prevalent in the past? No one suggested that a governor 
taking all this money in gifts is okay. So, they are going to still 
find ways to prosecute, right? 
 
MR. STEIN: That is right. I think what is really telling 
McDonnell is that Virginia did not have a law that made it 
impermissible for the governor to take gifts. If you look at some 
of the cases, for example, they sort of respond to some of the 
points Alexandra made. The prosecutor still has to prove corrupt 
intent and they still have to look for evidence that the target was 
intentionally concealing his conduct or trying to invade state 
restrictions of what they could or could not do or be dishonest 
about what they were taking or receiving. I think when you have 
that kind of evidence of someone who is not just receiving gifts 
in exchange for some official action but someone who is clearly 
concealing it, lying about it, or trying to structure their behavior 
or evade state requirements, that would go to establish a corrupt 
intent and be helpful facts to prosecutors. 
One other point I would make is part of what worries me a 
little bit about McDonnell, as a former prosecutor, is the fact that 
the people who are engaged in the conduct at issue are aware of 
McDonnell in many instances. Amie mentioned that it would be 
19
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wise for prosecutors to instruct their informants to make a 
specific act or a specific official action and the thought occurred 
to me that if someone is running an investigation, that that is 
sure fire way of getting your targets. As soon as they heard that, 
they would say, no, this is just a meeting to not engage an official 
action but rather to have access to public officials. 
 
JUDGE BRICCETTI: There are other statutes that could be 
utilized by federal prosecutors such as Section 666 of Title 18,32 
which, as I understand it, basically makes it a crime to accept or 
demand money with the intent to be influenced in connection 
with one’s official duties, when the person is an official of an 
agency that receives federal benefits in excess of $10,000 within 
a one-year period. Does McDonnell apply to Section 666 
prosecutions, and what recent cases involve Section 666? 
 
MS. SHAPIRO: That is an interesting question that has 
been litigated a bit already in the Southern District of New York 
and in the Second Circuit. 
There was a case decided last summer, a few days before the 
Silver decision,33 United States v. Boyland,34 in which the Circuit 
affirmed the conviction. Boyland had been charged under 
several different statutes including Section 666. The Court held 
that the jury instruction in Boyland on the honest services fraud 
statute was no good after McDonnell because of the 
constitutional concerns, even though unlike in McDonnell, the 
parties had not agreed to use the Section 201 definition. 
Nevertheless, the Court goes on to say that it does not reach the 
same conclusion with respect to the instructions about the § 666 
count, supposedly because § 666 “is more expansive than § 201,” 
in that it “prohibits individuals from ‘solicit[ing]. . . anything of 
value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in 
connection with any business, transaction, or series of 
transactions of [an] organization, government, or agency. . . . We 
do not see that the McDonnell standard applied to these 
 
32.  18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012) 
33.  United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2017). 
34.  862 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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counts.”35 
I think this is a little odd, because clearly the honest 
services fraud statute doesn’t remotely contain these terms in 
Section 201 either. But in any event, this is somewhat of a throw 
away paragraph in this opinion which goes on, by the way, to 
find that the errors in the other jury instructions are harmless 
errors. There are several § 666 cases that are pending where this 
issue has come up, and in some of them the government has 
taken the position that under Boyland McDonnell doesn’t apply. 
We had this issue with the Skelos case, which was decided 
about a month after this.36 There, the Court asked us for 
supplemental briefing on Boyland as well as Silver, which also 
was decided before they decided Skelos. We argued two things: 
first, we argued that Skelos was different, because the “official 
act” instruction was the same for the § 666 count and the other 
charges (Hobbs Act extortion as well honest services fraud). The 
District Court had given one official act instructions that applied 
to all the counts. The government had asked for that, and the 
indictment also described eight alleged official acts that were 
applicable to all the counts. That was our main argument. We 
also argued, without quite saying that Boyland should be 
overturned, that it didn’t make sense.  The Court of Appeals in 
the Skelos case ended up agreeing with us.  The Court held that 
because of the way the case was indicted and tried, it could not 
affirm the § 666 count on the grounds that McDonnell did not 
apply. And the Government has indicated in a letter to us that 
they are not going to take the position at the retrial that the 
§ 666 count does not require proof of an official act as defined in 
McDonnell. 
There was another case which I tried last summer involving 
alleged bribery of two U.N. officials by a Chinese businessman, 
in which we had a similar debate at the charge conference. The 
Government argued very strongly that McDonnell should not 
apply and opposed an official act of instruction, and Judge 
Broderick gave an official act of instruction.  But it was a 
watered-down version of the instruction and did not use the 
specific language from the definition of McDonnell.  I suspect 
 
35.  Id. at 291 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012); emphases and alterations 
in original). 
36.  See United States v. Skelos, 707 F. App’x. 733 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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that issue eventually may be decided by the Second Circuit. 
In the Percoco case,37 which as far as I know is still on trial 
unless there’s been a verdict or a mistrial this morning, this 
issue came up as well.  Judge Caproni did decide that the official 
act instructions should be consistent with McDonnell and 
applied to all the counts, including those based on § 666. She 
said she was only doing it because of the way the indictment was 
charged. She also issued an opinion on the motion to dismiss 
rejecting the applicability of McDonnell to § 666.38 So, I think 
you are going to see more percolation of this issue, and maybe 
the Second Circuit will revisit it in a case where it has a lot more 
importance to the outcome than it did in Boyland. 
 
JUDGE BRICCETTI: Now, Amie, traditionally the 
principal reason why federal prosecutors have pursued 
investigations and prosecutions of state and local officials is 
because of the perception that federal prosecutors have more 
resources. They have the FBI. They have the federal 
government, but as you said earlier, it doesn’t have to be done 
by the feds. It could be done by the state. Is there a problem 
about resources? Are there resources available to local 
prosecutors to meet the challenges of prosecuting local officials? 
 
MS. ELY: The short answer is it depends. Just looking at 
the state attorney general office systems, some attorneys 
general have complete criminal jurisdiction in their state. Some 
attorneys general have very little. Like the district attorney’s 
office, the very, very busy places are less likely to be able to do 
the long-term, thoughtful investigation that you need to do in 
any kind of white-collar case – including and especially public 
corruption cases. 
That said, I will talk about some successes and then I will 
talk about some challenges. 
 
 
 
37.  United States v. Percoco et al., 16-CR-776 (VEC), 2017 WL 6314146 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2017). 
38.  Id. at *4.  
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Right around the same time that the Menendez39 case and 
the Seabrook40 cases in New Jersey and New York, respectively, 
were declared mistrials, a state Senator named Phil Griego was 
convicted in New Mexico in a case brought by the Attorney 
General. It is not a one-to-one sort of comparison, but it is an 
example of a state corruption prosecution success. Michael 
Hubbard was convicted in Alabama, despite some real political 
issues. The attorney general’s office there also successfully 
prosecuted the Governor of the State. 
New York has convicted a number – at the DA-level and 
through the AG’s office – a number of officials including Rubin 
Willis, a city councilman. 
And New Jersey, at the AG office level, convicted the Mayor 
of Paterson. 
So, there are some really terrific cases, perhaps that are not 
in the press quite so much but are really important and show 
that there are in some states really capable, strong enforcers. 
There are resource issues. Some of those can be financial. 
Some of those financial issues can be occasioned by the cases 
themselves. In Alabama, when Mike Hubbard was charged, at 
some point during his trial, the legislature threatened to strip 
the funding from the entire attorney general’s office. Not just the 
corruption unit, but the entire office. That is the sort of challenge 
that a federal prosecutor does not have to face. 
That said, about a week ago the now-former Attorney 
General of the state whose office was imperiled in that way gave 
a speech to other Attorneys General in D.C., and encouraged 
them to have corruption units. He said, “[i]f you’re looking for 
something that’s turbulence free, this is not the way to do it. If 
you really care about representing the people of your state about 
ensuring that we have good government, this is a really 
important space for us to work in.”  
For the attorneys general offices that have jurisdiction to do 
this kind of work, they do have a little bit more ability, I think, 
than district attorneys to do the longer-term cases, to start 
trying to partner with federal authorities. 
 
39.  United States v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d 606 (2018). 
40.  United States v. Seabrook, 16-CR-467, 2017 WL 3995630 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 9, 2017). 
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There are certainly cases that are investigated by both 
federal and state authorities, which is something that I’m 
frankly trying to push, particularly after McDonnell. I think 
McDonnell does provide an opportunity for the state and federal 
officials to intentionally work together in a thoughtful way to 
figure out who’s got the resources and who has the laws to 
appropriately deal with behaviors that, without a doubt, citizens 
are very unhappy about and very disgusted by. 
There are some ways resources and training available for 
state and local prosecutors, including my Center for Ethics and 
Public Integrity. We can do training for prosecutors to teach 
them how to investigate these more complex cases. Jennifer 
Rodgers’s Center on Advancement of Public Integrity also has a 
lot of terrific resources. 
I will end on this: one of the big changes from being a federal 
prosecutor to working with state prosecutors is recognizing that 
federal subpoenas are a beautiful thing and they go everywhere. 
State subpoenas only go to the end of state line. So, there’s 
something called the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of 
Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings. This 
is the sort of thing that is important to state prosecutors doing 
more complicated cases where you need to have the ability to, for 
example, get bank records from outside of your state. You need 
to have the ability to not have the boundary of your state be 
impermeable. We’ve pulled together a chart with information 
about the Uniform Act statutes across the country and are trying 
to develop contacts around country so we can “matchmake” when 
prosecutors need help in another state. And we have provided 
training about how to get out-of-state materials, so they can 
investigate these more complicated cases, including corruption 
cases. 
 
JUDGE BRICCETTI: Thank you, Amie. Dan, we have been 
talking about the prosecution of state and local officials, but of 
course, federal officials have been the subject of corruption 
prosecutions as well. My question is, is there a difference 
between how federal prosecutors approach corruption 
investigations of state and local officials as opposed to cases 
involving federal officials? 
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MR. STEIN: In some ways, yes and in some ways, I think 
the answer is no. The benefit of working on an investigation of a 
federal official as a federal prosecutor is you don’t need to worry 
about all the legal complexities that come including at the 
honest services fraud statute or the § 666 statute or Hobbs Act 
extortion which in my view are all really efforts to shoehorn 
Federal jurisdiction over State and Local officials, perhaps 
appropriately, perhaps not. 
People have different views about that. In federal cases 
dealing with federal officials you really do not have to worry 
about those things. You have statutes that apply. You have the 
conflicts of interest statute. That is a good example. In Skilling,41 
the Supreme Court said that honest services fraud would not 
reach claims of conflicts of interest. Pure conflicts of interest 
about a quid pro quo of a bribery or a kickback because the 
statute does not provide for that and made an analysis about 
what the core of the statute was. You do not have the concern 
with federal officials because as I said in this conflicts of interest 
statute that Congress has spoken about clearly. It was my 
experience at least that most of my cases involved New York 
officials there was a much greater degree of transparency when 
dealing with the federal government whether in the legislature 
or an executive agency where you could at least track in a clear 
way what bills you were to produce, by whom, who lobbied on 
support of those bills, what action were taken by a federal 
agency. It is much more transparent at the federal level than it 
sometimes is at the state level. 
In New York State, to just figure out when a bill was issued 
and what was introduced and by whom, can be a real challenge, 
and so I think often and also even trying to track state funds 
through state agencies can be incredibly complicated. In my 
experience in the federal government, there is much greater 
transparency and, therefore, at least I think, it makes it easy for 
prosecutors to trace money and to try to figure out whether those 
cases were at the state level. 
 
 
 
 
41.  Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010). 
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JUDGE BRICCETTI: Alexandra, most of what we have 
been talking about today involves private benefits received by a 
public official or his family rather than receiving campaign 
contributions, but why are not there more prosecutions involving 
campaign contributions? Hypothetically, I’ll contribute $100,000 
to your campaign but you’ve got to do this for me. Quid pro quo, 
no question about it. Why aren’t there more of those 
prosecutions? 
 
MS. SHAPIRO: I think the main reason has to do with a 
Supreme Court case called McCormick,42 and because campaign 
contributions are speech protected by the First Amendment. 
It goes all the way back the way back to Buckley v. Valeo in 
the ‘70s.43 The Supreme Court held that campaign contributions 
are protected by the First Amendment. As a result of that, the 
Court later held that in a quid pro quo bribery case, where the 
bribe was allegedly a campaign contribution, prosecutors had to 
prove that an explicit quid pro quo.  By contrast, when you’re 
talking about a private benefit, like the gifts to Governor 
McDonnell, the agreement does not need to be explicit.  There is 
a notion that if you can prove winks and nods, that’s enough, 
because it would be rare that you could really prove a more 
explicit agreement, unless you had wiretap. And, by the way, 
some Courts have said in this context that there is a difference 
between “express” and “explicit.” I think that is a bit silly, 
personally, but regardless, it is much more difficult to prove a 
quid pro quo in the campaign contribution context because of the 
McCormick case. 
I do not have any personal knowledge of the investigation of 
the Mayor, but I always wondered if part of the problem for the 
prosecutors might also have something to do with this principle 
there as well. As I understood it, the allegations were all 
contribution-related, and perhaps proof of an explicit agreement 
was lacking.  Unlike McDonnell, that has been the state of the 
law for a long time. It is just a function of our Constitution and 
how the Supreme Court treats campaign contributions. 
 
 
42.  McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991). 
43.  424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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MR. STEIN: Can I jump in on that question, as well? 
 
JUDGE BRICCETTI: Sure. 
 
MR. STEIN: I think that is right in terms of the 
investigation of the Mayor. One quick point that I would like to 
see more prosecutors try to do, if possible, is it always occurred 
to me that it makes perfect sense to say, I am making a 
contribution of an exercise of one’s speech rights if you are 
supporting a candidate in their efforts to get out the message 
and make public their positions. I would like to see more 
prosecutors look at candidates than take campaign funds for 
their own personal uses. There’s a fraud on their contributors 
because their contributors are making donations thinking the 
money is going to be used for these speech-related purposes, but 
if it is just going into the candidate’s pocket, that really is 
something different. 
One quick story on that that I always laughed at: We had a 
Senator in New York who was prosecuted many years ago. He 
was picked up on a wiretap talking to another elected official 
about how campaign funds could be used and could not be used 
and his explanation was as long as my constituents would want 
it, then I could spend the campaign money on it. For example, 
he said my constituents want me to look good. I can use the 
money to buy some new suits. 
 
JUDGE BRICCETTI: I am going to ask Dan one more 
question and then I am going to try to leave a few minutes to 
take questions from the audience. It is kind of related to the last 
thing you said. Does it matter whether the action taken by a 
public official was desirable or beneficial; does it matter if the 
public official has taken the same action regardless of the money 
received, or if he does a good thing with the money he received? 
Does that matter in this context? 
 
MR. STEIN: I think the short answer is no. It really does 
not matter. As a legal matter, I think in the Silver case, for 
example, one of his defenses was the grant money that I gave as 
the quo, in the quid pro quo, was for cancer research and who 
would oppose cancer research, and that prosecution’s take was 
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that may or may not be, but the reason you gave that money was 
not out of some public minded purpose but because of the private 
interest. 
 
JUDGE BRICCETTI: The private interests were what in 
that case? 
 
MR. STEIN: That he was receiving referrals for asbestos 
cases. 
 
JUDGE BRICCETTI: Under New York law he was able to 
affiliate with the law firm and in effect receive referral fees for 
cases that came in the law firm involving people who have had 
cancer as a result from asbestos; is that correct? 
 
MR. STEIN:  Correct. 
 
MS. SHAPIRO:  Can I just make one comment? 
 
JUDGE BRICCETTI:  Sure. 
 
MS. SHAPIRO: I agree with what you said. It is definitely 
never the case that there would be any defense based on the 
public good that comes from the legislation.  But certainly in the 
Skelos44 case and in some other cases, there might be an 
argument that has to do with the strength of the government’s 
proof of the politician’s supposed corrupt intent. 
For example, in the Skelos45 case, the parts of the case that 
do not involve the meetings and all of the things that aren’t 
official acts after McDonnell, involved two kinds of legislation.  
One of our arguments was, and will continue to be, that there is 
no way that he could have had a corrupt purpose or intended to 
sell his vote on the legislation in exchange for these folks hiring 
his son, because he was known to be a supporter of the 
legislation already and would have continued to support it 
regardless. 
 
44.  United States v. Skelos, 707 F. App’x. 733 (2d Cir. 2017). 
45.  Id. 
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JUDGE BRICCETTI: We could go on all day. These issues 
are not new. Those of us who are old enough to remember the 
Abscam prosecution back in the ‘70s involving basically sting 
operations with both federal and local officials. A lot of these 
issues came up then, and they continue to come up today. This 
panel is unbelievably knowledgeable about this. So, we could 
spend a whole day just with this panel, but we are not going to 
do that. There are other panels who are terrific, as well. Does 
anybody have a question or a comment? Yes, sir? 
 
ATTENDEE: Mr. Stein, with relation to Silver,46 ultimately 
a conviction or gets a new conviction, would that have an effect 
on the asbestos cases? Can now because of his referrals to say a 
litigant who feels or thinks they did not get the proper 
representation and they should have gotten a bigger piece of that 
pie, do you think there is going to be a trickle-down effect? 
 
MR. STEIN: To be honest, I’ve never thought about that 
possibility. 
 
JUDGE BRICCETTI: Usually you say that is a great 
question. 
 
MR. STEIN: I think I have to say I do not know if there 
would be any implication. There was never, as far as I know, any 
allegation that the law firm did not do a good job on the asbestos 
cases. I think from the prosecution’s perspective it was merely a 
way to get money to Mr. Silver, but that is a good question. 
 
JUDGE BRICCETTI: For which there is no answer. 
Everyone who is in law school, well, the answer could be this or 
it could be that. Does anybody else have a question? 
 
ATTENDEE: Could one of you comment more about the 
Boyland47 case and the implications of McDonnell setion 666 
prosecutions? I guess I am trying to understand how the 
 
46.  United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2017). 
47.  United States v. Boyland, 862 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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McDonnell48 ruling affects or could affect future section 666 
prosecutions because a quick look at the Boyland49 decision did 
not clarify it. 
 
MS. SHAPIRO: No, it doesn’t. It really is just that 
paragraph that I read.  And, if I remember the facts of the case 
correctly, one of the reasons the error was harmless was that it 
was pretty obvious that the acts Boyland50 was allegedly taking 
in exchange for the payments for were clearly official acts under 
McDonnell. 
 
JUDGE BRICCETTI: One last question. Yes, sir? 
 
ATTENDEE: Dan, you had mentioned possibly using the 
public – the conflict of interest statute when prosecuting federal 
officials as opposed to McDonnell. Would the definition for 
“public action” be the same under that statute because that is 
where McDonnell kind of stepped in? I just wondered what the 
public action would be in a conflict of interest case as opposed to 
the other way? 
 
MR. STEIN: I would have to look more closely at the exact 
language. I think it is pretty similar in the conflict of interest 
statute that the real difference is you do not have to prove that 
there was a quid pro quo. Simply taking an action while having 
a conflict of interest is sufficient. It does not have to be that you 
took the action in exchange for some payments and benefits. 
 
ATTENDEE: It is just that McDonnell technically said he 
did not take an official action. I was just wondering if that would 
change under 208. 
 
MR. STEIN: That is an excellent question. It probably does 
not change on that piece. It is more on the quid pro quo side of 
it. 
 
 
48.  McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). 
49.  United States v. Boyland, 862 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2017). 
50.  Id. 
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JUDGE BRICCETTI: We have had a terrific panel. Thank 
you all very much. 
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